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Abstract 
The S&P 500 lost 10% the week ending Friday, October 16, 1987, and lost an additional 20% 
the following Monday, October 19, 1987. The date would be remembered as Black Monday. 
The Federal Reserve (the Fed) responded to the crash in four distinct ways: (1) issuing a 
public statement promising to provide liquidity, as needed, “to support the economic and 
financial system”; (2) providing support to the Treasury securities market by injecting in-
high-demand maturities into the market via reverse repurchase agreements; (3) allowing 
the federal funds rate to fall from 7.5% to 7.0% and below; and (4) intervening directly to 
allow the rescue of the largest options clearing firm in Chicago. 
Keywords: Federal Reserve, stock market crash, 1987, Black Monday, market liquidity   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 









At a Glance  
The S&P 500 lost 10% the week ending Friday, 
October 16, 1987, and lost an additional 20% the 
following Monday, October 19, 1987. The date 
would be remembered as Black Monday. 
The Federal Reserve (the Fed) responded to the 
crash in four distinct ways: (1) issuing a public 
statement promising to provide liquidity, as 
needed, “to support the economic and financial 
system” (FOMC 1987a); (2) providing support to 
the Treasury securities market by injecting in-
high-demand maturities into the market via 
reverse repurchase agreements; (3) allowing the 
federal funds rate to fall from 7.5% to 7.0% and 
below; and (4) intervening directly to allow the 
rescue of the largest options clearing firm in Chicago. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) also made personal phone calls to large 
banks in New York and Chicago to encourage them to provide credit as needed.  
Summary Evaluation 
The actions taken by the Federal Reserve are broadly recognized as having contributed to 
the improvement in market conditions. Despite the dramatic drop in stock prices, there were 
no significant runs on banks and the broader economy did not enter into a recession.  
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To ensure the functioning of stock, 
options, and Treasury markets during and 
after the crash; helping prevent the crash from 
causing a downturn in the broader economy. 
  




Tuesday, October 20, 1987 
The Federal Reserve’s Response to the  
1987 Market Crash 
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(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$4,657.6 billion in 1986 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$19,071 in 1986 
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debt) 
 




















Size of banking 
system 
 
$3,062.9 billion in total assets in 1986 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
65.8% in 1986 




Size of banking 




Banking system assets equal to 27.5% of 
financial system in 1986 
Banking system assets equal to 26.5% of 
financial system in 1987 
 
Source: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve 
 
5-bank concentration 
of banking system 
 
Data not available for given years 
 




in banking system 
Data not available for given years 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
Data not available for given years 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
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Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
1986 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
1987 
 











From January to the end of August 1987, the stock market rose nearly 40%. The sharp 
increase has been attributed to the 1980s increase in demand for equities by new investors, 
such as pension funds, and favorable tax treatment of corporate buyouts (Carlson 2006). 
However, the rise in stock prices stopped in September and came crashing down in October. 
The S&P 500 lost 10% the week ending Friday, October 16, and lost an additional 20% on 
Monday, October 19, 1987. The date would be remembered as Black Monday (US Senate 
1988). 
The stock market crash has been attributed to a number of factors: (1) a larger-than-
expected trade deficit announcement by the Federal Government (Bernhardt and Eckblad 
2013); (2) a “triple witching” day on Friday, October 16, 1987—a day when stock index 
futures, stock index options, and stock options expire on the same day (Bernhardt and 
Eckblad 2013); (3) large margin calls as the market deteriorated, which greatly reduced 
market liquidity (Carlson 2006); (4) portfolio insurance automatic programs that were 
designed to shift portfolio allocations from stocks to cash as markets declined (Carlson 
2006); and (5) index arbitrage automatic programs that arbitraged price differentials in 
futures markets and cash markets (Carlson 2006). 
Due to the “unheard of levels” of sell orders, many stocks were delayed in trading for as long 
as two hours on the morning of Monday, October 19, 1987 (De Maria 1987). Trade volume 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) nearly doubled that of the previous record (Metz et 
al. 1987). The turbulence and high volume continued through the week ending Friday, 
October 23, 1987. See Figure 1 for S&P 500 index around the time of the crash. The chart 
includes actions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE), and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). It would take more 
than a year and a half for market values to return to their pre–Black Monday highs. However, 
despite the dramatic unrest in financial markets, the broader economy did not dip into a 
recession (NBER, n.d.).   
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Figure 1: S&P 500 Index around the Time of the Crash  
 
Source: Carlson 2006.  
 
Program Description 
On Tuesday, October 20, 1987, before markets opened, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) made 
its first move in response to the stock market crash. A one-sentence public announcement 
was released to assure markets that the Fed would provide liquidity “to support the 
economic and financial system” (Carlson 2006).  
Via repurchase agreements, the System Open Market Account (SOMA) provided reserves to 
the banking system at a more expansive quantity and earlier in the day than normal 
(Greenspan 1988). Subsequently, “the federal funds rate dropped from above 7-1/2 percent 
just before October 19 to 7 percent and below immediately following the stock market 
collapse” (FOMC 1987a). Figure 2 charts the Effective Federal Funds Rate and the Overnight 
Repo Rate for the second half of 1987. 
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Figure 2: Overnight Interest Rates 
 
 
Source: Carlson 2006. 
 
The demand for US Treasury securities with certain maturities increased sharply as 
investors exited equity markets. To alleviate some of the pressures in the Treasury market, 
the Federal Reserve suspended “the size limits imposed on loans of securities to individual 
dealers and the requirement that such loans not be related to short sales” (FOMC 1987a). 
The Federal Reserve effectively entered into reverse repurchase agreements with the 
primary dealers. The Federal Reserve would lend Treasury securities with maturities that 
were in high demand to the primary dealers. As collateral for the loan, the primary dealers 
would give the Federal Reserve Treasury securities with maturities that were not in high 
demand (FOMC 1987b). 
The hours of operation for the Federal Reserve’s payment system, Fedwire, were extended 
on several occasions (Carlson 2006). 
Margin calls increased at member firms of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the 
Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE). The member firms borrowed heavily from Chicago-
based settlement banks. Traditionally, the member firms would pay back the Chicago banks 
with funds from their parent companies, New York–based broker-dealers. With the 
increased quantity and size of margin calls, there were concerns that the margin calls would 
not be met. However, “to help make the extensions of credit and transfers of funds proceed 
smoothly, the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and New York … let commercial banks in 
both districts know that the Federal Reserve would help provide liquidity for the loans” 
(Carlson 2006).   
The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York made personal phone calls to large 
New York banks, encouraging them to provide credit to the financial system as needed: “The 
banks were told to keep an eye on the big picture—the global financial system on which all 
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their business ultimately depends” (Carlson 2006). There was a temporary, one-week spike 
in discount window borrowing from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (approximately 
$2 billion) that was rolled off by the following week (see Federal Reserve 1987a; Federal 
Reserve 1987b; Federal Reserve 1987c). This helped allow, “the 10 largest New York banks 
[to] nearly double their lending to securities firms during the week of October 19” (Bernanke 
1990). The rest of the Reserve Banks didn’t see any substantial change. 
Continental Illinois (the bank that had been bailed out in 1984 and gave rise to the term “too 
big to fail”) subsidiary First Options of Chicago Inc. was hit with substantial losses on Black 
Monday. First Options looked to Continental Illinois for emergency funding; however, when 
First Options was purchased by Continental Illinois, regulators placed lending caps on the 
amount of funding Continental Illinois could provide to First Options. It is reported that 
“Greenspan acted quickly to enable Continental Illinois Corp., the bank’s holding company, 
to inject funds into the options subsidiary. Without that action, one official says, ‘the options 
exchange would have shut down’” (Chicago Tribune 1987; Cohen 1987; Murray 1987). 
Then–Fed Chair Greenspan reported to Congress that additional bank examiners had been 
placed in “major bank institutions [to] monitor bank developments” (Greenspan 1988). 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) held daily conference calls from October 19–
30, “to assess the extraordinary developments in financial markets” (FOMC 1987a). 
Outcomes 
By Wednesday, October 21, 1987, the market had recovered 58% of the Black Monday losses. 
However, it wouldn’t surpass the August 1987 high until May 1989.  
The havoc in financial markets did not spread to the broader economy (NBER, n.d.). GDP 
continued to grow through 1987, 1988, and 1989 (FRED, n.d.-a). The unemployment rate 
continued to decrease until the unrelated 1990 recession (FRED, n.d.-b). And despite the 
increase of reserves in the system via the open market operations, the inflation rate 
remained stable (FRED, n.d.-c). During the week of the market crash, there was no significant 
run on deposits (Kohn 2006).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Federal Reserve issued a one-sentence, public statement committing to 
provide liquidity as needed. 
The following statement was issued before markets opened on Tuesday, October 20, 1987:  
“The Federal Reserve, consistent with its responsibilities as the Nation’s central bank, 
affirmed today its readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and 
financial system” (Carlson 2006). 
On Monday, October 19, 1987, Chair Greenspan traveled to Dallas to deliver a prescheduled 
speech at the American Bankers Association. The Federal Reserve Vice Chair, Manuel 
Johnson, gathered a group at the Board of Governors’ office in Washington, DC. The group 
included: Donald Kohn, the director of the division of monetary affairs; Edwin Truman, the 
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staff director of the division for international finance; William Taylor, the staff director for 
bank regulation and supervision; and General Counsel Michael Bradfield. The group 
monitored international markets overnight and drafted a statement on liquidity. Before 
being published on Tuesday morning, the statement was reviewed by Greenspan and Gerald 
Corrigan, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Murray 1987). 
2. Via reverse repurchase agreements, the Federal Reserve provided Treasury 
securities with in-high-demand maturities to the market. 
The demand for US Treasury securities with certain maturities increased sharply as 
investors exited equity markets. To alleviate some of the pressures in the Treasury market, 
the Federal Open Market Committee members agreed to temporarily suspend: 
1) The size limits imposed on loans of securities to individual dealers 
2) The requirement that such loans not be related to short sales (FOMC 1987).  
In order to provide more of the Treasury securities with in-high-demand maturities into the 
market, the Federal Reserve effectively entered into reverse repurchase agreements with 
the primary dealers. The Federal Reserve would lend Treasury securities with maturities 
that were in high demand to the primary dealers. As collateral for the loan, the primary 
dealers would give the Federal Reserve Treasury securities with maturities that were not in 
high demand (FOMC 1987b).  
3. The Federal Reserve allowed the federal funds rate to fall by approximately 50 
basis points.  
“The federal funds rate dropped from above 7-1/2 percent just before October 19 to 7 
percent and below immediately following the stock market collapse” (FOMC 1987a).  
The prevailing monetary policy regime focused on influencing the money supply; short-term 
interest rates were a secondary focus. As seen in the following quote, the FOMC tracked the 
federal funds rate, but the amount of fluctuation the committee would tolerate was much 
greater than it would later be when the policy regime shifted to influencing the short-term 
interest rates directly. Notes from the next scheduled FOMC meeting following the market 
crash read, “The members agreed that the intermeeting range for the federal funds rate, 
which provides a mechanism for initiating consultation of the Committee when its 
boundaries are persistently exceeded, should be reduced from 5 to 9 percent to 4 to 8 
percent.” (FOMC 1987a). 
4. The Federal Reserve intervened to allow Continental Illinois (a bank holding 
company) lend above the legal limit to its subsidiary First Options of Chicago Inc. 
(then the largest options clearinghouse).   
Continental Illinois (the bank that had been bailed out in 1984 and gave rise to the term “too 
big to fail”) subsidiary First Options of Chicago Inc. was hit with substantial losses on Black 
Monday. First Options looked to Continental Illinois for emergency funding; however, when 
First Options was purchased by Continental Illinois, regulators placed lending caps on the 
amount of funding Continental Illinois could provide to First Options. It is reported that 
“Greenspan acted quickly to enable Continental Illinois Corp., the bank’s holding company, 
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to inject funds into the options subsidiary. Without that action, one official says, ‘the options 
exchange would have shut down’” (Chicago Tribune 1987; Cohen 1987; Murray 1987).   
III. Evaluation  
The actions taken by the Federal Reserve are broadly recognized as having contributed to 
the improvement in market conditions. Two of the largest reviews of the Black Monday 
market crash and its aftermath both highlight the significance of the Federal Reserve 
interventions.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission’ Division of Market Regulation reported, “The 
Division believes that the actions of the FRB and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
encourage major banks to continue their prudent financing of securities firms were critical 
in avoiding any potential for a liquidity gridlock” (SEC 1988). 
The Brady Report, a federal executive branch report, concluded, “Had decisive action not 
been taken by the Federal Reserve, it appears that far worse consequences would have been 
a very real possibility” (Brady Report 1988). 
Then academic economist Ben Bernanke summarized the actions taken by the Federal 
Reserve as follows: “In performing its lender-of-last-resort function, the Fed redistributed 
risks in the system in a socially beneficial way. Conceptually, it is as if the Fed had provided 
ex post insurance to the clearinghouse against a shock that it seemed possible would exhaust 
the insurance capability of the clearinghouse itself. Thus the Fed became the ‘insurer of last 
resort’” (Bernanke 1990). 
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